Fesolving the impact of debt policy on saving is no easy task. There are only a few, rather subtle testable differences between, for example, the life cycle model (Modigliani and Brurnberg (l95) ) that predicts crowding out from debt policies and the infinite horizon Barro (l9T) model that predicts no crowding out. Section II contains a short discussion of this point and a description of tests that can potentially discriminate between these models.
The main contribution of this paper is to examine empirically Barro's model of intergenerational altruism. A restatement of the proposition that intergenerational transfers do not influence saving is that saving is invariant to the age distribution of resources.3 This proposition is directly tested by measuring the excess influence of the age distribution of personal income and components of personal income on aggregate consumption given the level of consumption predicted by our formulation of the Barro model. This model, which is described in section III, differs from that underlying the traditional time series consumption regression (e.g., Feldstein (l971), Barro (19T8) , Munnell (l9Tlii, Darby (l9T9) ) by explicitly incorporating earnings uncertainty, rate of return uncertainty, and demographic change into the optimal consumption decision. From the perspective of uncertainty models, the standard consumption specification seems quite naive; indeed, the failure explicitly to model uncertainty produces major conundrums over squeezing data from an uncertain world into a certainty model (Leinier and Lesnoy (1981) ). Our approach to including uncertainty in the analysis involves estimating simple stochastic processes for earnings and the return to savings and explicitly solving for the optimal consumption path of the infinitely lived Barro-type family. We then test whether, given the optimal predicted consumption program, the age distribution of resources has an impact on actual aggregate consumption.
Since the age distribution of resources is obviously influenced br changes in the population age structure, the model controls for such changes by taking explicit account of variations in the size and age distribution of the population.
Section IV contains a description of the data and the specification of earnings and return uncertainty. The empirical findings are discussed in section V, and concluding comments appear in Section VI.
I. Government Fiscal Policy and National Saving
In considering the government's potential impact on saving one might ask whether postwar growth in total (federal, state, and local) government consumption relative to NNP could be a key factor. The ratio of government consumption to NNP has increased, but the increase has been fairly modest.
Government consumption averaged 21.14 percent of net national product in the 1950s, 23.0 percent in the 1960s, 23.5 percent in the 1970s, and 23.1 percent in the period l980_19814. If, during the last 5 years, government consumption had been 21.14 percent rather than 23.1 percent of NNP and if private consumption as a share of NNP had not changed, the net national saving rate would have averaged 6.5 percent rather than 14.7 percent. Assuming that private consumption is invariant to changes in government consumption seems, however, highly unrealistic. At one extreme, government consumption ny substitute perfectly for private consumption (Bailey (1961) and David and Scadding (19714) ). In this case the 1.1 percentage point increase in the ratio of government consumption to NNP between the 50s and early BOs would, abstracting from issues of tax distortions and redistributions, have been completely offset by a 1.7 percentage point decrease in the ratio of private consumption to NNP, leaving the net national saving rate unchanged. With government consumption a perfect substitute for private consumption, the private sector's ultimate disposable income is simply NNP; and the private saving rate would coincide with the net national saving rate. From this perspective, the key question is why the private sector's saving behavior changed such that total consumption, private plus government, rose as a share of NNP.
At the other extreme, government consumption might not enter private utility functions at all, or might enter separably. In choosing its consumption level one would expect the private sector in this case to view NNP-G, where G is government consumption, as its ultimate disposable income, since current government consumption must ultimately be financed by the private sector)
In the l950s the private sector saved 10.9 percent of this definition of disposable income. In the 1980s the corresponding saving rate has been only 6.1 percent. Had the private sector maintained its 1950's 10.9 percent rate of saving out of NNP-G, the rise in the ratio of government's consumption to NNP would have generated only a L5 percent decline in the net national saving rate between the 1950s and 1980s, rather than the I6.6 percent drop actually observed. From this perspective the increase in the government's rate of consumption out of N1P contributed, at mast, a small amount to the decline in the net national saving rate. Again, the real question is why an appropriately defined private saving rate fell during this period.
-5--A second accusation that could be levelled at government policy is that the use of distortionary taxes to finance both its consumption and transfer expenditures has reduced incentives to work and save. While there was some increase in average marginal taxes on labor earnings, the increase was modest and seems unlikely to account for the decline in the U.S. saving rate. A recent article by Barro and Sahasakul (1983) suggests that the average marginal tax on labor income was 22 per cent in the 1950s, 22 percent in the 1960s, and 27 percent in the 1970s.5
These marginal tax figures exclude social security's payroll tax.
However, there is reason to believe that inclusion of Social Security's tax and benefit provisions in the analysis would reduce rather than raise estimated marginal labor taxes particularly in the 1970s. Blinder and Gordon's (1981) analysis suggests that social security's tax and benefit provisions constitute a sizeable subsidy to labor earnings of married males and others leaving net effective marginal taxes on labor earnings for these groups quite low. Boskin and Hurd (198k) confirm the significant size of the Gordon effect. Crediting the public with the perspicacity and knowledge required to assess correctly the marginal social security return on the marginal tax contribution may be unrealistic; but the opposite assumption, that workers believe they receive no return at the margin for marginal social security tax payments, seems equally implausible. If one takes an intermediate view that workers view marginal social security taxes as providing marginal social security benefits of equal present value, then the post 1950 rise in the average marginal tax on labor income is adequately captured by Barro and Sahasakul's estimates.
Marginal saving incentives are also determined by capital income taxes. Several studies argue that effective capital income taxes, at least on corporate source income, rose substantially in the 1970s (e.g., Feldstein and Summers (1919) Another type of policy that could potentially be blamed for the saving decline is intragenerational redistribution from the rich to the poor. The poor may have a higher rate of time preference than the rich. Alternatively the poor may be liquidity constrained. In either case the poor within arr age group will have larger marginal propensities to consume than their better endowed contemporaries; and intragenerational transfers from the rich to the poor will lower saving. Emily Lawrence (1983) recently examined the potential effect of intragenerational redistribution on saving using a life cycle simulation model.
Lawrence considered verj substantial differences in time preference rates between the rich and poor as well as liquidity constrained consuription by the poor. She found that even very significant intragenerational redistribution, such as that characterizing U.S. welfare programs, has only minor effects on saving in life cycle models.
The explanation for these small changes in the case of differences in time preference rates is simply that neither the associated differences in marginal consumption propensities across the two groups nor the size of the simulated transfers are sufficiently large to have much impact on the econorrrj's total wealth accumulation. In the case the poor are liquidity constrained, their marginal consumption propensities are unity; but the change in disposable income multiplying their unitary propensities is only current transfers. For rich, unconstrained transferers, the reduction in current consumption equals their much smaller marginal propensity to consume multiplied by the present value of transfers, which is typically a much larger number than simply the current payment. The reduced consumption of the rich offsets to a significant extent the increased consumption of the liquidity constrained poor producing only a small reduction in national saving despite a quite substantial program of intragenerational transfers. We conclude from this and related dels that intrageneratiorial redistribution is probably not a major determinant of the decline in the U.S. saving rate since 1950.
A fourth channel by which government policy may have reduced saving is by transfering resources from younger and future generations to older generations. Intergenerational transfers towards older generations, which is referred to here as debt policy, can be and have been conducted in quite subtle ways.
The unfunded financing of the U.S. Social Security System is by now a well -8-understood, if nonetheless quite subtle, debt policy (Feldstein (l971) ). Less well unde rstood debt policies are changes in the tax stracture that shift the burden of taxation from older to younger age groups (Summers (1981a), Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983a) ) and changes in tax provisions that raise market values of financial assets and, thereby, transfer resources to older age groups who are the priinaiy owners of such assets (F'eldstein (1977), Summers (198Th) ). An example of the former type of policy is switching from income taxation to wage taxation. An example of the latter policy is reducing investment incentives (Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983b) ). Since investment incentives in the U.S. are effectively provided only to new investment, old capital, capital that has been fully or partially written off, sells at a discount reflecting the differential tax treatment. A reduction in investment incentives means a smaller discount and a capital gain to owners of old capital. Younger and future generations are worse off as a result of such policies because they rrn.ist now pay a higher price to acquire claims to the econoiry's capital stock.
In addition to these ire subtle mechanisms of transferring to older generations, governments can engage in debt policies by reducing taxes levied on current generations and raising taxes levied on future generations.
Intergenerational redistribution of this variety may eventuate in larger officially reported deficits. An example in which even this ire obvious fonn of redistribution does not necessarily alter official debt calculations is when such tax cuts and tax increases are coincident, respectively, with equivalent reductions and increases in the level of government consumption.
The fact that very significant intergenerational redistribution can be run without its ever showing up on government books suggests that officially -9-reported deficits are at best a verj poor indicator of underlying economic debt policies.6 This proposition notwithstanding, there has been an enormous public interest, especially in recent years, in officially reported deficits.
Curiously, public attention has focused only on a subset of official liabilities of the federal government and has essentially ignored both the official assets of the federal government as well as the official assets and liabilities of state and local governments. As discussed by Boskin (1982 Boskin ( , 1985 , Eisner and Pieper (l981), and the 1982 Economic Report of the President, the n.rket value of the U.S. federal governmentts official assets may currently equal if not exceed the market value of its official liabilities.
In light of the very significant if not overwhelming difficulties of gauging the extent of true debt policies from official reports, it seems safer to assess post war U.S. debt policy by asking the following question: were the lifetime budget constraints of older generations expanded significantly in the post war period as a consequence of government policy at the. expense of contracted budget constraints for young and future generations? One might point, in this context, to the enormous expansion of the social security system which greatly increased the budget opportunities of the elderly. The problem, however, with considering any one component of government policy is that it may have been instituted to offset some other component; i.e., the postwar redistribution through social security to the elderly y simply represent the government's way of compensating the elderly for higher income taxes over their lifetimes or for their contribution to the nation during World War II. Just as there is no single correct way to measure offical deficits, there is no single correct way of posing counterfactuals about observed government transfer policies. To put this point differently, intergenerational redistribution must always be assessed relative to some benchmark, and the choice of a benchmark seems inherently subjective. The implication of this point is that any calculation of the magnitude of postwar intergenerational transfers will be arbitrary.7
Having conceded this point we believe that at least one interesting, if arbitrary, counterfactual to pose with respect to postwar U.S. debt policy is an econoir with either a very small unfunded social security program targeted toward the elderly poor or a larger, but fully funded social security system.
There is little need to review here the well-known facts about the magnitude of the U.S. Social Security system 'whose unfunded liabilities appear to range between 4 and 6 times the size of the U.S. government's official liabilities.8
The growth of this program was coincident with the decline in the net national saving rate. The social security system appears to represent the only (potentially) discrete postwar intergenerational transfer policy capable of producing a major drop in the national saving rate. Simulation studies of the potential savings impact of unfunded Social Security suggest a possible reduction in long-run savings of 20 to 25 percent (Kotlikoff (1979) and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983c) ).
To summarize this section, we have identified four stylized features of fiscal policy, viz., government consumption, the extent of distortionary taxation, intragenerational transfers, and intergenerational transfers, each of which can affect a nationts saving behavior. We have tried to argue, although hardly exhaustively, that of these four features of fiscal policy, intergenera-tional transfers are the most likely to have generated a decline in the U.S. saving rate over the last three and a half decades.
We turn next to a brief discussion of recent empirical attempts to resolve the impact of debt policies on saving. In the course of reviewing this literature we indicate that there have been surprisingly few tests designed to distinguish sharply among broad models of saving. Rather than testing more fundamental propositions of particular saving models, st of the research has concentrated on the empirical impact of particular policy variables on consuiuption and savings. This focus has been excessive; indeed, in trany studies the predicted impact of policy variables on dependent variables is the same under models with quite different implications about the affect of debt policies on national saving.
II. Empirical Analyses of Debt Policies
Much of the recent empirical research relating to the effects of econornic deficits falls into two categories: cross-sectional analysis of social security's impact on household wealth accumulation and time series analysis of the consumption impact of government policy variables, such as social security wealth. Many cross-sectional studies have proceeded without clealy formulating rejectable hypotheses concerning Barro's (197) 4) conjecture of intergenerational altruism. These studies, including those of Feldstein and Pellechio (1979) and Kotlikoff (1979b) , involve regressions of household private wealth on social security tax and transfer variables. The central question posed in niuch of this literature is whether households reduce their private asset accumulation when young because of the anticipation of receiving net wind-.
fall transfers when old. The evidence here is mixed, but even if each of these studies had strongly confirmed the proposition that expected future windfalls lead to higher current consumption arid, therefore, less private wealth accumulation, the results would still leave unresolved the issue of altruism; the altruistic hypothesis, like the life cycle hypothesis, suggests that increases in the future resources of a particular household should raise that household's consumption and lower its own savings. In the altruistic case, however, the all other altruistically linked households in the extended family. Indeed, a central proposition of the altruism hypothesis is that the consumption of particular extended family members depends on the resources of other extended family members. Unfortunately, this latter proposition is not tested in the cross-section empirical literature, nor does it appear capable of being tested, at least for the U.S., given available micro data sources (although Kurz (1982) indirectly examines altruistic behavior using data on transfers.) While this distinguishing implication of the altruism del has not been tested, a distinguishing implication of the pure life cycle uodel, that the elderly have larger marginal consumption propensities, has been directly tested by Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1981) . Their findings are weakly supportive of this proposition. Other implications of the life cycle idel have also been analyzed. For example, Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) find that life cycle saving cannot explain the bulk of U.S. savings. Several studies addressing dissaving after retirement by Darby (1978) , Mirer (1979) , David and Menchik (1980) , and The time series analyses of Feldstein (l9'fl, 1982) , Munnell (l971), Barro (1918) , Darby (1919) , Leimer and Lesnoy (1981) , and numerous others have proved inconclusive. The econometrics here is plagued by problems of aggregation, simultaneity, and errors in defining variables such as social security wealth. Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983c) Curiously, the time series studies have been quite vague with respect to which of several (e.g., life cycle, Keynesian, or altruistic) saving models is being tested. As a consequence a variety of ad hoc specifications have been employed. In a time series context taking the life cycle model as the null hypothesis immediately runs afoul of the paucity of cohort specific time series data. Absent such data key parameters cannot be identified and one cannot test two basic propositions of the life cycle models alluded to above: First, that consumption of a particular cohort depends only on its own resources and not collective societal resources; and second, that older cohorts have larger rrarginal consumption propensities.
The Barro idel is much more suited to analysis with time series data since only collective, rather than cohort specific resources are predicted to influence aggregate consumption. This proposition is particularly useful in incorporating government policy in the model. In a certainty model the private Barro economy's budget can be written as the economy's total human plus nonhuman resources (including those owned by the government) less the present value of government consumption. As described below an analogous private budget constraint, involving only government consumption, i.e., requiring no information about taxes, arises witri uncertainty.
As mentioned, the key proposition of the Barro ndel that consumption depends on collective resources and does not depend on the age distribution of resources is the focus of our empirical work. To test this proposition, we specify the Barro nde1 under earnings and rate of return uncertainty and determine whether, given the consumption predicted by this nodel, variables measuring the age distribution of resources significantly influence actual consumption.
Data obtained from annual current population surveys on the age distribution of income, including wages and salaries, property income, and government transfer payments, are used for this test. In addition, we use data compiled by Dean Leirner and Selig Lesnoy (1981) on the distribution of net Social Security wealth by age.
III. The Barro Model with Demographics and Uncertain Earnings and Returns
The expected utility of the "infinite horizon" Barro family at time t, U, is written in equation (i).
The function u( ) when multiplied by 0a indicates the family's period t+t utility associated with the consumption of a member age a at t+r, a In this formulation of the utility from particular family members' consumption, the 0a parameters can be thought of as age-specific utility weights. They determine the relative consumption of different family members at a point in time; i.e., they determine the shape of the cross secion age-consumption profile. t+T,a is the number of family members age a (with maximum longevity of D) at time t+T, and c is a discount factor. Since we are applying this model to the entire U.S. economy, t+Ta corresponds to the U.S. population age a at t+T. The function TJ( ) is assumed to be of the iso-elastic form, i.e. is:
Ec+1:1(l
In (14) is the nrginal effective capital income tax, which is assumed here to be nonstochastic.
At any point in time the relationship between consumption of different age groups is given by: 
In this model the distribution of tax burdens either at a point in time or over time has no impact on consumption choice; hence government policy is fully described by the evolution of Gt and the marginal effective capital income tax, Given the time paths of these policy variables as well as earnings and return distributions, equations (14), (5), and (7) can be used in -iTsolving for the optimal choice of consumption at any point in time. In contrast to other analyses such as Feidstein (l9T)-) and Barro (19T8) , this formulation avoids the difficulties of defining and measuring government debt policy variables such as Social Security wealth.
In this one good model all net worth terms, A, A, and At. are measured at replacement cost rather than market value. This method of expressing the private and government budget constraints plus the fact that r is the pre-tax rate of return implies that Tt includes taxes levied both on households and on businesses. To illustrate the point consider an econorrrj with a single tax levied on the profits of businesses at rate p. Also assume the government permits full expensing of new investment. For simplicity assume private assets consist only of holdings of capital, Kt, end official government debt, Dt. As described in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983b) the market value of private capital is (l_1i)K, where K is the replacement value of capital at t.
Since the return on capital paid by-business with full expensing is the pre-tax return, the private sector budget constraint with assets valued at market prices is:
Rewriting (8) yields:
corresponds to expensing rebates obtained from the government, and i.irtK corresponds to business profits taxes. The corresponding government equation is:
Subtracting (9) from (8') yields (T).
The three equations (14), (5), and (7) that are used to solve for the optimal consumption program can be further simplified by using (5) to express (14) and (7) in terms of the consumption of a Barro family member age a*.
Ct,a* -G)(1
Solving for the Optimal Consumption Program
Our method of deterrriing the optimal consumption plan is to solve the finite period analogue to the infinite horizon ndel for a time horizon sufficiently large that extending it would make no difference to our results. The finite period problem is solved using dynamic programming. At time t+t the consuinrtion function Ct+a* is given by:
Ct+a*(At+t) = At+ -Gt+
Substituting this expression Into the Euler relationship (4') for period t+'r-l yields:
(ii)
Ct+_i,a*1 Et+i ct+ a* ÷r1(1
The accumulation equation (7') for At+_ can now be plugged into (11):
Et+t_iCt+t,a* E(At+_i_ht_iCt+T_i,a* -Gt+_i)(l+rt+_i(l_6+_i))
where ht_i = a0
From (11') and the implicit function theorem we have that is a rnotonic increasing function of A -, i.e.:
t+t-l
Ct+_ia* = ct+_ia*(At+_i;
In ( 
IV. Specification of Return and Earnings Uncertainty and Description of the Data
The model outlined in section III assumes that current and future population age distributions are known with certainty. To be consistent in modeling earnings uncertainty, we also assume that Barro family planners understand the impact of projected demographic change on future total labor earnings distributions. More generally, we assume that the age distribution of earnings is known with certainty. What is uncertain then is the level of earnings at future dates for a representative worker. Let w+1 * be the random annual earnings of the benchmark worker age a* at time t+r. Then total earnings at t+T, can be expressed as:
Wt+T a* a0 t+t,a t+t,a t+T,a where t+T,a is the non-stochastic ratio of earnings of a worker age a at t+t to that of a worker age a* at t+t, and is the non-stochastic work experience rate for the population age a at t+T. Econo,r wide net worth is measured as the sum of private plus government reproducible tangible wealth nasured at replacement cost estimated by the BEA, plus the value of private land estimated by the Federal Reserve. These and other series are deflated to 19T2 dollars. Given wealth in years t and t+l, and year t earnings, private consumption, and government consumption, equation (7) can be used to solve for r+T. This procedure was used to determine the pretax rate of return series for the period 19146 through 19814.
Data for the age distribution of resources, which, according to the Barro model, is irrelevant for aggregate consumption, was obtained from the annual Current Population Surveys (CPS) for the years 1968 through l984.
While the CPS data does not provide information about asset holdings, it does include property income, wage and salary income, and government transfers including welfare, food stamps, unemployment compensation, veterans' benefits, and Social Security retirement and disability benefits. These data and the CPS population weights are used to construct shares of total income as well as shares of labor income, property income, and social security income of households with heads whose ages fafl in particular age categories.
V. Testing the Intergenerational Altruism Model
Equation (15) In (is) C is actual consumption, Ct( ) is the level of total consumption predicted by our idel and depends on the age-utility weights e,...,OD, the relative risk aversion coefficient y, and the time preference rate p, where p =
The variables s1 through s are year t shares of personal income or components of personal income of in different age groups. The error is assumed to be normally distribited with mean zero and variance a2. A test of the altruism model, conditional, of course, on both our specification of intergenerational altruism and our functional forms for utility as well as earnings and return uncertainty, is that all the Xs are zero. Note that the alternative bypothesis includes most other consumption theories such as the life cycle nxdel.
Before presenting the results of this regression it is useful to describe values of the C( ) series and changes through time in the shares of personal income and its components received by different age groups. Table 1 presents actual consumption and consumption predicted by our ndel (C( ))
for selected years for alternative values of a and y. Consumption is measured in 1912 dollars. The age-utility weights in this arise for other choices of the values of 0 at ages 15 and 80.
From the preliminary examination of alternative parameters values described in Table 1 , it appears that for certain sets of parameter values the model presented in section III does fairly well in predicting actual consumption. Of the parameter combinations examined in the table, a value of y equal to 2, p equal to .04, and 0 equal to .5, produces the smallest root-mean squared error for consumption. These parameter values are certainly within the middle of the range of those that have been estimated. Table 2 contains, for selected years, various income shares of households whose heads are in particular age groups. The table also indicates the fraction of all households with heads in particular age intervals; and it displays the ratio of the average income of households with heads in a particular age category to the average income of all households. Table 2 indicates some sizeable changes in income shares of particular age groups and income ratios are indicated in Table 2 for labor income and transfer income. Table 3 reports maximum likelihood estimates of equation (15) excluding income shares, including income shares of all age groups, and including only the income share of households age 6 and older. Maximum The first column of Table 3 confirms consunrption. According to these estimates a redistribution of 10 percent of income from the youngest to the oldest age group would raise U.S. consumption by .7 percent, evaluated at the mean value of consumption. With prevailing saving rates, a .7 percent increase in consumption would lower the net national saving rate by over 10 percent.
The significance of' age resource distribution variables does not apply to the three components of income for which we have separate data, labor income, -27-property income, and social security income. To reduce computation costs we constrained y, p, and 0 in this analysis to equal their imxiiaim likelihood estimates from column (1), Hence, for a range of a priori choices of y, p, and 0, nst, but not all, of the test statistics for the inclusion of income shares are significant. 
VI. Conclusion
The results presented here clearly reject our formulation of the altruism model. However, it should be restressed that the model imbeds strong
assumptions not only about preferences, but also about the extent and nature of uncertainty. Rather than a rejection of altruism, the significance of the age resource shares may reflect misspecification of the altruism model that is correlated with age resource shares. For example, the age resource shares might conceivably enter in the processes determining earnings and rates of return.
In this case, the state variables, S, in c( ) should include the age resource information, and the exclusion of this information would bias the results.
Alternatively, there may be a large number of discreet altruistic families with different age structures. In this case, changes in the age distribution of resources will typically be associated with changes in the interfamily distribution of resources, and such changes would be expected to alter aggregate consumption)-2
The paper's contribution is, hopefully, not only to test a particular formulation of the Barro proposition, but to stimulate additional research that directly tests central implications of lifecycle and altruistic saving models. These average annual net national saving rates are based on NIA data. The 198)4 saving rate is 5.2 peroent, a lower value than observed in any year in the l950s. The saving rate over the past 15 years has averaged only slightly more than three quarters of the average rate of the previous two decades.
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One might argue that zero intergenerational transfers is an objective benchmark. There are at least two problems with such a benchmark. First, distinguishing negative intergenerational transfers from taxes required to finance government consumption is completely arbitrary. Second, past intergenerational transfers imply (require) offsetting current or future intergeneration transfers. Hence, taking zero intergenerational transfers as the benchmark requires considering a world in which intergenerational transfers in the past had always been zero. 8. 1982 Economic Report of the President, Appendix to Chapter .
9.
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